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Introduction* 
Founded in 1911, the National Legal Aid & Def ender 
Association ("NLADA") is a private, nonprofit organization 
committed to the provision of high quality legal services 
for poor people in America. Dea th penalty cases which 
almost al ways feature an impoverished defendant and which 
are noted for their extreme complexity and the extraordinary 
professional demands they make upon lawyers -- particularly 
merit our commitment to high quality legal services. 
To that end, NLADA is among those who have responded to 
the critical lack of quality representation in death penalty 
cases. NLADA recently adopted Standards for the Appointment 
and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases ( "NLADA 
Standards") in an attempt to improve the representation 
afforded to poor defendants.! NLADA also publishes Capital 
Report, which features articles on trends in the trial, 
appellate, and post-conviction stages of death penalty 
* The National Legal Aid & Defender Association 
gratefully acknowledges the work of the American Bar 
Association Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus. 
Rationalizing Federal Habeas Corpus . Review of State Court 
Criminal Convictions in Capital Cases (May 1, 1989) -- the 
task force's background and issues paper drafted by Reporter 
Ira P. Robbins -- has been a valuable resource in the 
preparation of this submission. 
1 The NLADA Standards were recently adopted by the 
American Bar Association House of Delegates under the name 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases. 
" 
cases. In addition, NLADA earlier this year conducted a 
death penalty defense training conference for more than 200 
lawyers from around the country. NLADA also offers death 
penalty defense training at the Annual Conference. 
Sadly, a prominent failing of the system of capital 
punishment in the United States today is the lack of quality 
legal representation at each and every stage of death 
penalty cases. Too many lawyers who undertake 
representation in these cases lack expertise in an area of 
the law that all concede to be intricate and sophisticated 
even for the expert. Indeed, these lawyers sometimes enjoy 
only the most rudimentary experience in basic criminal law. 
Furthermore, these lawyers lack necessary assistance and are 
shockingly underpaid. 
This critical lack of quality legal representation 
produces unfair and inequitable results. As a for mer law 
clerk to Justice Stevens has said, "the death penalty 
frequently results from nothing more than poverty and poor 
lawyering."2 Poor legal representation in these capital 
cases also exacts a heavy toll from the criminal justice 
system. Because of the unique finality that comes with an 
execution, thorough appellate and post-conviction review of 
capital cases -- at both the state and federal levels -- is 
a moral and constitutional imperative. When truly quality 
2 Sloan, "Death Row Clerk," 
February 16, 1987. 
The New Republic, 
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lawyering is absent, each successive stage of that review is 
sure to be more complicated, protracted and disorderly. 
From NLADA's perspective, it is simply impossible to 
bring order to post-conviction capital litigation unless and 
until the quality of legal representation at all stages of 
capital cases is improved. Such improvement is possible, 
but only if our criminal justice system is willing to make 
the commitment. Meaningful standards must be enforced to 
ensure that the lawyers who undertake these difficult cases 
are equipped for the task. And the resources necessary to 
provide quality legal representation must be guaranteed. 
A. The Critical Need For High Quality Legal 
Representation At Trial And On Appeal 
From practical, moral and constitutional standpoints 
alike, death differs qualitatively from all lesser 
punishments.3 Precisely because death is different, in no 
place is the need for high quality legal assistance more 
acute than throughout a capital case. Indeed, the special 
need for counsel in the unique circumstances of death 
penalty litigation was recognized at the time the republic 
3 "Death, in its finality, differs more from life 
imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of 
only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, 
there is a corresponding difference in the need for 
reliability in the determination that death is the 
appropriate punishment in a specific case." Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion 
of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.). 
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r, 
was born. In § 29 of the Act of April 30, 1790, the same 
First Congress that proposed the Bill of Rights provided for 
the appointment of up to two counsel in capital cases. 
But quality representation at each stage of a capital 
case has proved difficult to attain. In part, the problem 
inheres in the nature of a capital case. "The defense of a 
capitally charged individual involves an enormous 
under taking. • Obviously, the job is not one for every 
member of the bar or even every member of the criminal 
defense bar."4 At issue is murder, the most heinous crime. 
Highly charged at every stage, these cases are not for the 
faint of heart or the unseasoned. As former Chief Judge 
John C. Godbold of the Eleventh Circuit has said: 
The community is often inflamed. 
The press is often inf lamed. The 
state trial judge is often inflamed 
if you question what he did. The 
trial counsel is often inflamed if 
you must question what he did.5 
Nor are these cases for the inexperienced, the 
unprepared, or the unsupported. Homicide law is itself a 
subtle and nuanced area of substantive criminal law, yet it 
is a model of simplicity when compared with the other legal 
4 
366, ---' 
People v. Wade, 233 Cal. Rptr 48, 76, 43 Cal. 3d 
729 P.2d 239, 258 (1987) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). 
5 "You Don't Have To Be A Bleeding Heart" 
Representing Death Row: A Dialogue Between Judge Abner J. 
Mikva and Judge John C. Godbold, Human Rights, Winter 1987, 
at 22, 23. See also Note, Summary Processes and the Rule of 
Law: Expediting Death Penalty Cases in the Federal Courts, 
95 Yale L.J. 349, 361 (1985). 
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challenges awaiting the defense lawyer in a capital case. 
Counsel must be current in the ever-changing law of 
constitutional criminal procedure and, moreover, intimately 
familiar with the extraordinary rules and principles unique 
to capital litigation. Of course, there are special federal 
constitutional rules which govern or might govern 
discovery6, trial preparation7, jury voir dire8, the taking 
of evidence9, closing argumentslO, jury instructions at the 
guilt phase of the trialll, jury instructions at the 








threshold of culpability 
6 ~, Neelley v. Alabama, 57 U.S.L.W. 3450 (U.S. 
January 9, 1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
7 ~, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
8 ~, Ross v. Oklahoma, 486 U.S. __ , 
2273 (1988); Turner v. Murrat, 476 U.S. 
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 8101985). 
108 S. Ct. 
28 (1986); 
9 ~, Skipper v. South 
(1986); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). 
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 
95 (1979); Gardner v. 
10 
(1985). 
~, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 4 72 U.S. 320 
Beck 
11 ~, Francis v. Franklin, 
v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980). 
471 U.S. 307 (1985); 
12 ~, Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. __ , 108 S. Ct. 
1860 (1988); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987). 
13 E.g. , Maynard V • Cartwright, 486 U.S. 108 s. __ , 
Ct. 1853 (T91IB). 
14 L.&..:.., Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 108 s. __ , 
Ct. 1981 (1988). 
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. I necessary to sustain the death penalty15, and the very 
method of deciding the question of life or death.16 What is 
more, equally unusual rules unique to capital litigation 
exist under state law. No less discomfort i ng for counsel is 
the further realization that a failure to preserve the 
client's claims in strict accordance with state procedural 
law might well lead to the client's death in spite of the 
merits.17 
Yet sound litigation skills and the mastery of 
sophisticated law are not enough. Counsel must also build a 
case on the facts, and the facts that are relevant to 
effective capital litigation are extensive indeed. The 
circumstances of the crime 
diminished culpability 
including any facts suggesting 
must be thoroughly investigated, 
but so too must be the defendant's character and background. 
In short, "death penalty jurisprudence and post-
conviction law bedevil the practitioner and the 
theoretician. In combination, the two areas are a minefield 
for the unwary."18 As the highest court of one state noted, 
"death penalty litigation has become highly specialized and 
15 ~, Tison v. Arizona, 481 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
U.S. 137 (1987); 
16 ~, Blystone v. Pennsylvania, cert. 






~, Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986). 
Mello, 
Crisis 
Facing Death Alone: 
on Dea th Row, 37 Am. 
- 6 -
The Post-Conviction 
U. L. Rev. 513, 531 
few attorneys have 'even a surface familiarity with 
seemingly innumerable refinements put on [the Supreme 
Court's Eighth Amendment decisions since 1976]. 111 19 
Befitting the complex and specialized nature of capital 
litigation, one would expect that lawyers with sufficient 
expertise, experience and resources would be called upon to 
do the work. That, however, is not in fact the case. The 
vast majority of capital defendants find their counsel 
appointed for them. In some jurisdictions, that may entail 
appointment of an overworked public def ender office. But 
other jurisdictions, including virtually all the counties in 
Texas, lack any indigent defense ins ti tut ion and instead 
rely upon a pool of local attorneys available for 
appointment by the court. 
In far too many of these cases, the lawyer receiving 
the appointment lacks the expertise, experience and 
resources necessary to responsibly conduct a capital 
defense. Indeed, some of these lawyers have no particular 
expertise in criminal matters at all. A first-year intern, 
or even an experienced family practitioner, would never be 
permitted to perform open-heart surgery. In a capital case, 
the defendant's life is no less at stake -- yet his life is 
too often placed in the hands of an ill-equipped or 
19 Irvin~ v. State, 441 So. 2d 846, 856 (Miss. 1983), 
cert. denied, 4 0 U.S. 1059 (1985) (quoting Evans v. State, 
441 So. 2d 520, 528 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1264 (1984)). 
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inexperienced lawyer. Justice Thurgood Marshall bore 
witness to the point in his 1985 remarks to the Judicial 
Conference of the Second Circuit: 
[C]apital defendants frequently 
suffer the consequences of having 
trial counsel who are ill-equipped 
to handle capital cases. Death 
penalty litigation has become a 
specialized field of practice. 
• • And even the most well-
intentioned attorneys often are 
unable to recognize, preserve and 
defend their clients' rights. 
Often trial counsel simply are 
unfamiliar with the special rules 
that apply in capital cases. 
Counsel, whether appointed or 
retained, of ten are handling their 
first criminal cases, or their 
first murder cases. When 
confronted with this, the prospect 
of a death penalty is ominous. 
Though acting in good faith, 
they often make serious mistakes. 
Thus, in capital cases I have read, 
counsel have simply been unaware 
that certain death penalty issues 
are pending before the appellate 
courts and that the claims should 
be preserved; that certain findings 
by a jury might preclude imposition 
of a death penalty; or that a 
separate sentencing procedure or 
phases of the litigation must 
follow a con vie tion. The federal 
reports are filled with stories of 
counsel who presented no evidence 
in mitigation of their client's 
sentences, simply because they did 
not know what to offer · or how to 
offer it, or had not read the 
state's sentencing statute. I kid 
- 8 -
you not, that has happened time and 
time again.20 
The consequences of sub-par legal representation at the 
trial level are disastrous to the defendant and to the 
criminal justice system. As the Supreme Court recently 
noted, our adversarial system of justice "is premised on the 
well-tested principle that truth -- as well as fairness 
is 'best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of 
the question. '"21 So long as unqualified -- well-meaning 
but still unqualified lawyers continue to represent 
capitally accused defendants, it will be the defendant's 
side which will lack the powerful statements on its behalf 
that truth and fairness demand. There is a decided risk 
20 Remarks of Justice Marshall at Judicial Conference 
of United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
September 6, 1985. 
For some examples of ineffective assistance, see Tyler 
v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 
1026 (1985); Dillon v. Duckworth, 751 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1108 (1985); Douglas v. 
Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531 (11th Cir. 1984); House v. Balkcom, 
725 F.2d 608 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); 
Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985); King v. Strickland, 714 F.2d 
1481 (11th Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded, 467 U.S. 1211 
(1984), adhered to on remand, 748 F.2d 1462 (1984), cert. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985); and Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 
792 (11th Cir. 1982). Other examples are discussed in, 
among other sources, Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The 
Arbitrary and Capricious Imposition of the Death Penalty in 
the 1980s, 14 N. Y. U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 797, 803-05 
(1986), and Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective 
Assistance of Counsel in Dea th Penalty Cases, 58 N. Y. U. L. 
Rev. 299 (1983). 
21 Penson v. Ohio, 57 U.S.L.W. 4020, 4022 (November 
29, 1988) (citations omitted). 
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that an unjust trial or sentencing hearing will produce an 
unjust conviction or an unjust death penalty. 
Poor representation at trial continues thereafter to 
tax the criminal justice system. Often, time and effort are 
later spent on appeal and in post-conviction to determine 
not so much whether counsel's performance was poor, but 
instead whether it was poor enough to offend the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.22 But considerable time and effort 
also are spent making up for counsel's initial shortcomings. 
Appellate judges and appellate lawyers alike know the 
impediments to sound decisionmaking that arise from a 
deficient trial record left by a poor attorney. When a 
trial attorney fails to investigate facts which might prove 
critical in defense or in mitigation of the offense, the 
competent and loyal appellate or post-conviction attorney 
has no choice but to perform the investigation. Similarly, 
it is not uncommon to find significant time and effort in 
post-conviction devoted to the development of factual 
records which the trial court in part because of 
inadequate defense counsel 
earlier.23 
neglected to fully develop 
22 The reporters contain numerous examples of very 
poor quality representation found to satisfy the 
constitutional minimum under Strickland v. Washing ton, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984). See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kemp, __ U.S. __ , 
107 S. Ct. 3249 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari); Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1088 (1986). 
23 ~. Smith v. Zant, 855 F.2d 712 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(factual record concerning whether mentally retarded 
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As Georgia Attorney General Michael Bowers has said, 
"If you can get death row inmates good lawyers at trial, I 
guarantee you these cases will move a lot faster."24 
Poor lawyering is not uncommon at the state appellate 
level either. Frequently, the same attorney who tried the 
case poorly undertakes the appeal as well. Such attorneys 
have been known to file inadequate, unreadable, poorly 
researched and unreasoned "briefs" that shed virtually no 
light on the real issues in the case.ZS 
B. The Critical Need For High Quality 
Legal Representation In Post-Conviction 
Proceedings 
As difficult and complicated as the trial of a death 
penalty case is, matters can be even more intricate and 
defendant intelligently waived Fifth Amendment rights); 
Spencer v. Zant, 781 F.2d 1458 (11th Cir. 1986) (ordering 
evidentiary hearing concerning jury challenge); Coleman v. 
Zant, 708 F.2d 541 (11th Cir. 1983) (ordering evidentiary 
hearing concerning extent of pretrial publicity). 
24 "Lack of Public Defenders Cited in Costly Death 
Row Appeals," Atlanta Journal & Constitution, Nov. 12, 1988, 
at Cl, col. 1. Justice Harold Clarke of the Georgia Supreme 
Court cone urred: "The better the [trial] lawyer, the less 
likely there is to be a long appeal.II Id. 
25 A lawyer who filed shockingly inadequate briefs in 
two death penalty cases in North Carolina (each brief under 
fifteen pages in length) recently was removed from the cases 
on the state supreme court's own motion. See State v. Wayne 
Alan Laws, No. 653A85 (N.C. S. Ct. July 28, 1987) (order 
removing counsel and appointing successor counsel); State v. 
Ricky Lee Sanderson, No. 125A86 (N.C. S. Ct. July 28, 1987) 




demanding in the post-conviction phase of a capital case. 
NLADA has warned practitioners: 
Representing a death-sentenced 
client in post conviction 
proceedings is as demanding as 
or, if that is possible, even more 
demanding than -- the tasks faced 
by other capital counsel. 
Especially when a death warrant has 
been signed, counsel is subjected 
to demands virtually impossible to 
meet physically, economically, 
temporally and emotionally. 
Seeking to ward off imminent 
execution while continuing to 
challenge the validity of the 
client's conviction and sentence 
may require filing pleadings almost 
simultaneously in several courts 
(often some distance apart). 
Investigation of factual issues may 
be necessary, and consultation with 
the client will require counsel's 
time and presence at yet another 
location.26 
The complex of doctrines relating to procedural default 
and the exhaustion of state remedies make the 
conviction lawyer's job more difficult still. 
post-
Justice 
Stevens was surely right to label these doctrines a 
"procedural maze of enormous complexity."27 To NLADA, the 
wisdom of continued maintenance of this maze -- at least in 
capital cases is highly questionable. Not long ago, 
Justice Black wrote for a unanimous Court that habeas corpus 
"is not now and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic 
26 Commentary~ NLADA Standard 2.1, at 15. 
27 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 497 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
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remedy."28 It is not easy to square that historic vision of 
the writ with a practice which today permits the execution 
of one individual while sparing the life of another solely 
because one lawyer neglected to present the issue in the 
precise manner that another did.29 Furthermore, application 
of these doctrines in capital cases imposes a great cost on 
the federal courts that outweighs the largely theoretical 
gains made in the name of federalism.30 
28 Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). 
29 Such results happen today. Com1are Stanley v. Kemp, 737 F.2d 921 (11th Cir.), applicationor stay denied, 
468 U.S. 1220 (1984) (defendant executed notwithstanding 
claim of unconstitutional jury instruction), with Thomas v. 
Zant, 800 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 
1041 (1987) (Stanley's more culpable codefendant granted 
relief for the unconstitutional instruction). 
30 See, e.g., Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of 
Federal Rights, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1128, 1221-22 (1986): 
One might argue that when life is 
at stake, constitutional claims should 
not be forfeited unless the state can 
prove a deliberate bypass by the client 
himself or, when participation by the 
client is not feasible, an intentional 
waiver by his counsel. By stressing the 
personal nature of constitutional rights 
and their vindication, such a standard 
would reflect the heightened solicitude 
generally shown capital defendants. 
See also Brown v. Grammer, 665 F. Supp. 773, 777 (D. Neb. 
1987) (Lay, C.J., sitting by designation) (questioning the 
costs and benefits of adherence to procedural obstacles to 
habeas corpus). 
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All agree that there is today a counsel crisis in 
capital post-conviction proceedings: 
While death 
[T]he post-conviction capital 
defendant who cannot afford a 
lawyer is left to the mercy of 
volunteer lawyers. If voluntary 
representation is not available, 
the defendant must act pro se or 
accept death without attempting 
habeas proceedings. The shortage 
of volunteer attorneys and the 
ever-growing death row population 
raises the spectre of pro se 
defendants lacking adequate skill 
to present the issues in habeas 
proceedings, or worse, executions 
of defendants unable ever to 
marshall such an effort.31 
penalty "resource centers" have in some 
jurisdictions undertaken the chore of recruiting volunteer 
counsel to handle post-conviction cases, the evidence 
suggests that continued reliance on volunteer counsel will 
be unavailing: 
[T]he pool of volunteer lawyers 
cannot expand rapidly enough to 
meet the growing need. As all of 
the ••• studies demonstrate, the 
time and effort required for the 
representation of the indigent 
defendant on death row is enormous, 
and the rewards are intangible. No 
study can document the emotional 
cost associated with the 
representation of a person whose 
sole lifeline may be the volunteer 
attorney. Comments submitted by 
volunteer attorneys • • • reflect 
the frustration and disenchantment 
of some of these practitioners. 
31 Committee on Civil Rights, 
Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 419, 425 (1984). 
The Death Penalty, 
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39 
While a valuable 
representation of 
inmates, a system 






The importance of high quality legal representation at 
the post-conviction stage of a capital case cannot be 
overemphasized. Without such representation and an 
effective system to deliver that representation -- chaos has 
reigned and will continue to reign. Indeed, it is not hard 
to see how the process as it now exists invites disorder. 
Reliance on volunteer attorneys necessarily entails initial 
delays while a volunteer is found. That delay, in turn, 
breeds a further delay while the volunteer attorney gathers 
the record and begins the post-conviction investigation (an 
investigation which, as already noted, may require extensive 
effort in cases where trial counsel was neglectful). 
Moreover, the volunteer counsel who finally undertakes the 
case is all too frequently unversed in the substantive and 
procedural intricacies of capital litigation. Substantial 
claims for relief, accordingly, may be raised poorly or not 
raised at all. These failings are in neither the 
defendant's nor society's interest, yet they are entirely 
predictable when reliance is placed on attorneys who lack 
expertise, experience and resources.33 
32 Wilson & Spangenberg, State Postconviction 




turned to a 
Powell 
system 
has observed, the State 




What these failings naturally generate are further 
problems and further delay. Complicated questions will 
arise as to whether particular claims were properly 
exhausted in the state courts. 
more complications will follow. 
If they were not exhausted, 
Where unexhausted claims 
are presented in a federal habeas corpus petition34, the 
case might be dismissed or might be held in abeyance while 
unexhausted claims are submitted to the state tribunals.35 
If the unexhausted claim is not discovered until after a 
habeas petition has been adjudicated, the problems 
associated with successive petitions may arise. 
Simply put, poor quality post-conviction representation 
needlessly complicates and protracts the litigation. It is 
perhaps time to heed the advice of Chief Judge Donald Lay of 
the Eighth Circuit. In 1972, Judge Lay in a different 
context wrote: 
Courts directly benefit from the 
fact that most potential litigants 
first present their problems to 
post-conviction capital proceedings 
inadequacy of using volunteer lawyers." 
Lewis F. Powell at the Eleventh Circuit 
(May 12, 1986), at 8-9. 
"because of the 
Remarks of Justice 
Judicial Conference 
3 4 "It is natural that counsel for the condemned in a 
capital case should lay hold of every ground which, in their 
judgment, might tend to the advantag~ of their client, but 
the administration of justice ought not to be interfered 





35 See, e.g., Neuschafer v. Whitley, 860 F.2d 1470 
Cir. 1988); Arango v. Wainwright, 716 F.2d 1353 (11th 
1983), reh'g denied with opinion, 739 F.2d 529 (11th 
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985). 
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competent lawyers who then engage 
in the necessary investigation and 
legal research to properly counsel 
the client in the merits of his 
case. 
There would 
we could emulate 
the area of 
litigation.36 
be much merit if 
this practice in 
post-conviction 
C. The Critical Heed For Standards And A 
System Designed To Continuously Deliver 
High Quality Legal Representation 
Several factors work together to bring about the poor 
quality of legal representation that plagues capital 
litigation both at trial and after trial. In each instance, 
improvement will not come until serious standards are 
instituted to ensure that only truly qualified lawyers 
undertake these difficult cases, until a system to ensure 
continued adherence to those standards is in place, and 
until the resources necessary to provide quality legal 
representation are committed. 
There are typically no fixed standards employed to 
determine who is well-equipped to handle a capital case and 
who is not. A civil practitioner with little to no criminal 
litigation experience let alone · experience in capital 
litigation ought not be charged with the heavy 
responsibility of a capital case, but such attorneys have 
36 Lay, Modern Administrative Proposals for Federal 
Habeas Corpus: The Rights of Prisoners Preserved, 21 De Paul 
L. Rev. 701, 734 (1972). 
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been known to undertake the representation.37 More 
importantly, an indigent defendant who is forced to rely on 
the state to appoint competent counsel is all too frequently 
at the mercy of an attorney who has neither the experience 
nor the skills necessary to effective representation in a 
capital case.38 
The NLADA Standards seek to rectify this situation. 
Among other things, they prescribe that at each stage of a 
capital case (i.e., trial, direct appeal, and post-
conviction) two qualified attorneys should be assigned to 
represent the defendant39, and they contain stringent 
minimum qualifications that attorneys must meet before they 
are appointed in capital cases. Those qualifications 
include a demonstration by the attorney that he or she has 
37 See House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d 608 (11th Cir.), 
cert. deni~ 469 U.S. 870 (1984) (two real estate lawyers 
who represented defendant on retained basis held to have 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel). 
38 See, e.,., King v. Strickland, 748 F.2d 1462, 1464 
(11th Cir. 1984 , cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985) 
(assigned counsel never discussed the defendant's background 
with him, did not investigate for helpful sentencing phase 
evidence, and made a closing argument in which he indicated 
to the jury that he was representing the defendant 
reluctantly). 
39 NLADA Standard 2.1. Some states require the 
appointment of two attorneys by rule or statute. hh, Ill. 
Rev. Stat. Ch. 110A, § 607 (1978); N.C. Gen. Stat. §7A-
450(bl); Rule 65, Qualifications for Eligibility to be 
Court-Appointed Counsel for Indigent Capital Defendants in 
the Courts of Ohio, adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court 
October 14, 1987. 
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on 
the necessary proficiency and commitment necessary to 
effective representation in a capital case.40 
There also is typically a lack of procedures designed 
to ensure the recruitment, appointment, and monitoring of 
attorneys who do capital punishment litigation. In many 
jurisdictions, trial lawyers are culled by a clerk or a 
resident judge from the rolls of attorneys available for 
court appointment with little to no consideration given to 
the attorney's actual q ual if ica t ions to handle a capital 
case. The process for securing post-conviction counsel is 
often similarly unstructured. 
The NLADA Standards also address this problem, calling 
upon each jurisdiction to formulate a "legal representation 
plan" that follows one of two equally acceptable approaches 
for formalizing the process of appointment. In general, the 
authority to recruit and select competent attorneys should: 
* Be centralized in the defender 
office or assigned counsel 
program of the jurisdiction; or 
* In jurisdictions where such 
centralization is unfeasible, be 
lodged in a special appointments 
committee made up of no fewer 
than five attorneys 
40 NLADA Standard 5 .1. The federal Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988 also mandates minimum q uali f ica tions for the 
appointment of counsel in federal capital cases and in 
federal habeas corpus proceedings arising from both state 
and federal death penalty verdicts. Pub. L. No. 100-690, 
102 Stat. 4181, 4394 (1988). 
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knowledgeable and experienced in 
the practice of capital cases.41 
Regardless of which method is chosen, the appointing body 
should adopt standards and procedures for the appointment of 
counsel. Moreover, specific and serious performance 
standards relating to various aspects of capital 
representation must be established and maintained. 42 The 
appointing body also should set forth standards and 
procedures for the continued monitoring of counsel and, 
where necessary, the removal of counse1.43 Furthermore, the 
legal representation plan for each jurisdiction should 
include sufficient funding to provide frequent training 
programs for counsel in capital cases and for those lawyers 
who desire to be placed on the roster of counsel available 
for assignment.44 
It is no secret that capital defense attorneys are 
tremendously undercompensated, in some cases making less 
than the minimum wage for defending someone on trial for his 
or her life.45 At trial, "[f]ees are so ridiculously low in 
41 NLADA Standard 3.1. 
42 NLADA Standards 11.1-11.9. 
43 NLADA Standard 7.1. 
44 NLADA Standard 9.1. 
45 In two Virginia cases, for instance, the attorneys 
received effective hourly rates of $0.58 and $3.30 
respectively. The Spangenberg Group, Study of 
Representation of Capital Cases in Virginia, November 1988. 
In a Mississippi case, the lawyer worked 400 hours and was 
paid $1,000 -- $2.50 per hour. Elvin, "Where Are The 
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death cases that one of two things will happen: either the 
lawyer or the client will be fundamentally shortchanged."46 
Compensation for post-conviction attorneys, where it exists 
at all, is equally woeful.47 Compounding the problem of 
inadequate compensation is the lack of resources necessary 
to preparation and presentation of an effective defense.48 
The resources made available to the defense 
substantially below those available to the prosecution.49 
As one court has noted, the result is inevitable: 
The link between compensation and 
the quality of representation 
remains too clear. See the dissent 
in Mackenzie [v.--Hillsborough 
County], 288 So.2d [200 (Fla. 
1973)] at 202 ("The adage that 'you 
get what you pay for' applies not 
infrequently. In our pecuniary 
culture the calibre of personal 
services rendered usually has a 
are 
Lawyers; Representation at Trial, 11 Journal of the National 
Prison Project, No. 12, Summer 1987, at 5. See also Tabak, 
The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious 
Imposition of the Death Penalty in the 1980s, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. 
L. & Soc. Change 797, 801-03 (1986). 
46 Gradess, "The Road from Scottsboro," Criminal 
Justice, Summer 1987, at 2, 46 (noting that several states 
limit trial counsel's fee to $1,500 or less). 
47 See The Spangenberg Group, Time and Expense 
Anal}sis in Post-Conviction Death Penalty Cases 11 (February 
1987 • 
48 ~, Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary 
and Ca ricious Im osition of the Death Penalt in the 1980s, 
14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 797, 801-10 1986); Gradess, 
"The Road from Scottsboro, 11 Criminal Justice, Summer 1987, 
at 2, 46. 
49 See, e.g., Comment, The Cost of Taking 
Dollars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 17 U.C. 




corresponding relationship to the 
compensation provided.").50 
This of course makes the search for qualified attorneys 
more difficult, particularly since these attorneys know that 
judges and prosecutors in capital cases do not work for 
reduced compensation. The NLADA Standards accordingly 
provide that capital counsel should be compensated for 
actual time and service performed, with the goal being to 
provide a reasonable hourly compensation that "reflects the 
extraordinary responsibilities inherent in death penalty 
litigation."51 
Finally, the quest for high quality legal 
representation in capital cases is made difficult by the 
simple fact that the law relating to capital punishment 
litigation is constantly and rapidly evolving. Resource 
centers -- when staffed by lawyers with expertise and when 
adequately funded -- can help to meet this practical problem 
by providing to capital litigators essential backup 
50 Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109, 1114-15 
(Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987). 
51 NLADA Standard 10.l(a). Standard 
prescribes full reimbursement for reasonable 
expenses and for periodic billing and payment. 
10.1 also 
incidental 
The An ti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, it should be noted, 
eliminates the maximum limits on fees and expenses that a 
judge may award to an attorney who handles a federal death 
penalty trial or a federal habeas corpus proceeding arising 
from either a state or a federal death penalty verdict. 
Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4394 (1988). 
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support.52 The NLADA Standards also are responsive to the 
problem, for they require that attorneys who wish to remain 
eligible for capital representation periodically attend and 
successfully complete approved training or educational 
programs.53 
D. The Critical Need For Meaningful Federal 
Habeas Corpus Review 
It is only appropriate to counsel caution to those who 
search for ways to bring more order to federal habeas corpus 
practice as it applies to death penalty cases. It would be 
tragically irresponsible to "experiment'' with the scope of 
the writ only to thereafter discover that its function as 
the guardian of federal constitutional rights had been 
compromised.54 
Thorough federal review of these cases on habeas is 
morally and constitutionally indispensable. The dramatic 
success rate of capital defendants who have sought relief by 
52 See Mercer v. Armantrout, 864 F.2d 1429, 1433 (8th 
Cir. 1988) (discussing advent of resource centers). 
53 NLADA Standard 9.1. 
54 In that respect, Chief Justice Rehnquist recently 
noted that "we are not talking about wholesale reshaping of 
the nature of [habeas corpus] jurisdiction, but about modest 
changes which will impose some structure on a system which 
at present often proves to be chaotic and drawn out 
unnecessarily." Remarks of Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist at the American Bar Association Mid-Year Meeting 
(February 6, 1989), at 13. 
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way of habeas corpus in federal court has been documented.55 
The significance of those figures is profound: 
In every one of these cases, the 
inmate's claims had been rejected 
by a state trial court and by the 
state's highest court, at least 
once and often a second time in 
state post-conviction proceedings; 
the Supreme Court had usually 
denied certiorari at least once and 
sometimes twice; and a federal 
district court had then rejected 
the inmate's claims of federal 
constitutional error infecting his 
conviction and/or death sentence. 
Yet in over 70% of the cases, a 
federal court of appeals found 
merit in one or more of the 
inmates' claims.56 
This "experience suggests that federal courts stand in 
a better position to adjudicate constitutional rights. "57 
To be sure, federal judges are insulated from the pressures 
of the political wi 11 of the majority in ways that many 
state judges are not. While the precise value which Article 
III independence contributes to the fair and thorough review 
55 "Between 1976 and 1983 federal appellate courts 
ruled in favor of the condemned inmate in 7 3. 2% of the 
capital appeals heard, compared to only 6.5% of the 
decisions in non-capital habeas cases." Mello, Facing Death 
Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorne Crisis on Death Row, 37 
Am. U. L. Rev. 513, 521 1988 footnotes omitted also 
noting that figure appears to have declined somewhat since 
1983). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense 
and Educational Fund, Inc., app. E, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 
U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080). 
56 Amsterdam, In Favorem Mortis, 14 Human Rights, 13, 
51 (Winter 1987). 
57 Coleman v. McCormick, No. 85-4242, slip op. 





of capital cases is no doubt impossible to quantify, there 
is good reason to believe it makes a contribution we cannot 
do without. Even routine death penalty cases are highly 
charged and hotly emotional contests. State judges are 
prone to those exigencies precisely because they are not 
benefitted by the genius of Article III. Indeed, it is 
inconceivable to think that a federal judge would experience 
a removal from office because he or she was willing to stand 
up for constitutional rights in capital cases. Yet that 
happened to Chief Justice Rose Bird of the California 
Supreme Court58 and nearly happened to Chief Justice James 
Exum of the Supreme Court of North Carolina.59 
Because "curtailing the federal habeas corpus 
procedures in death penalty cases would seriously undermine 
our commitment to constitutional values,"60 any proposed 
reforms must be scrutinized carefully. Given the need for 
58 See "Bird Hunting in California," Newsweek, 
December 9~ 985, at 30; "As Voters Try to Overrule a Top 
Judge," U.S. News & World Report, December 2, 1985, at 30; 
"Shaking the Judicial Perch," Time, September 15, 1986, at 
76; "A Vote on the Quality of Mercy," Newsweek, November 3, 
1986, at 63. 
59 See "Death Penalty Emerges as Key Issue in 
Campaign .for NC Chief Justice," The News and Observer, 
September 21, 1986, at Al, col. 3; . "Martin Says 'Nothing 
Wrong' with Group Assailing Exum," The News and Observer, 
October 3, 1986, at CS, col. l; "GOP May Push Death Penalty 
More," The News and Observer, October 4, 1986, at Al, col. 
1; "Heated Race Puts Partisan Judicial Election in 
Question," The News and Observer, November 2, 1986, at A35, 
col. 1. 
60 Coleman v. McCormick, No. 85-4242, slip op. at 
4719 (9th Cir. May 5, 1989) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
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flexibility in the handling of cases that every federal 
district judge experiences, and the fact that capital cases 
can differ markedly in the particular litigation needs they 
present, it also would seem that rigid timetables for the 
disposition of capital cases would prove unjust and 
unworkable. 
Conclusion 
Capital litigation in the United States today too often 
begins with poor legal representation. Thereafter, society 
pays the price as each successive stage of the case 
including the federal habeas 







representation after trial is also not uncommon, and it too 
imposes a cost on society at each successive stage of the 
litigation. 
Accordingly, orderly federal habeas corpus litigation 
in capital cases will come only when the quality of legal 
representation at all stages of capital cases is improved. 
With a serious commitment to quality and a serious 
commitment of resources, this goal can be attained. 
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